Federalism and responsibility by Micklitz, Hans-W. & Weatherill, Stephen
Chapter 1 
FEDERALISM AND RESPONSIBILITY 
HANS - W. MICKLITZ 
STEPHEN WEA TIIERILL 
Contents 
PART ONE: THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OFTHE RESEARCH PROJECT 
I. Product Emergencies: Tue background to the research 
II. Research Design and Methodology 
II.i. Part II of this Book; the Four Steps in the Original Project 
II.ii. Part I of this Book; the European Level of Product Safety 
II.iii. The Supporting Graphs 
III. How we have used Product Safety as a Window on broader Issues 
PART TWO: FEDERALISM AND RESPONSIBILITY - THE BROADER PICTURE 
I. Introduction - why "Federalism and Responsibility"? 
II. Markets and Legal Systems 
III. Tue Court and the Development of the Constitutional Principles of the 
European Comrnunity 
IV. Constitutionalization - the Broader Picture 
V. Tue Community: Beyond the Economy 
VI. Tue Treaty on European Union - the hidden State outside the EC 
VII. Tue Market without a State 
VIII. Bundesverfassungsgericht/ Federal ConstitutionaI Court 
VIII.i. The Decision in Context 
VIII.ii. The Cornpetence of the European Comrnunity 
VIII.iii. Judicial Dialogue and the Development of the European Community 
VIII.iv. States and Democracy 
IX. Beyond the Treaty on European Union 
X. Competence, Subsidiarity, Federalism and Responsibility 
X.i. Competence 
X.ii. Subsidiarity 
X.iii. Federalisrn 
X.iv. Responsibility 
XI. Product Safety 
PART ONE: THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
PROJECT 
1. Product Emergencies: The background to the research 
3 
3 
5 
5 
6 
6 
7 
II 
11 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
22 
23 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
29 
29 
30 
32 
33 
34 
The thesis which underpins the broadening of the project holds that product 
safety has its own intrinsic importance, but that it also acts as a window on 
broader issues in the development of the Community. In particular, the material 
gathered in connection with the case studies raised questions about the 
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possibilities and limitations of "Europeanisation" of enforcement practice. Both 
case studies had a cross-border element which presented problems for 
enforcement agencies which were simply insoluble without reference to the 
wider, integrating market. Through this lens, it is possible to see national 
structures undergoing a process of change. lt is no longer feasible to focus 
exclusively on the national State as the sole protector of its citizens from unsafe 
goods in the light of the legal and economic developments which have denied 
national, regional and local authorities in the Member States competence to 
influence trade flows at their borders or even within their territories. 
Administrative structures too are driven to embrace the consequences of market 
integration. That might be summarised as a process bearing overtones of 
"federalism", in so far as that emotive and elusive term denotes a pattern of 
functions distributed among different levels in an organisation. The national 
State is changing its contours and simultaneously contours at a European level 
are slowly becoming better defined. If this is by nature "federalist", as the book's 
chosen title suggests, then it also demands a sense of accompanying 
"responsibility." A process which dissolves long-established State structures in 
favour of a European Community and, indeed, a European Union implies a need 
to allocate responsibility for at least some of these undermined traditional State 
functions to new (quasi-federalist) institutions. 
These are questions which may be traced in fields as diverse as, for example, 
Environmental Policy, Social Policy and Industrial Policy. They are also 
questions which are pertinent to the difficult notion of the rights which may be 
enjoyed by the Citizen of the European Union, a status introduced but little 
elaborated by the Treaty on European Union 1. This book identifies the recurring 
question as the need to specify which levels of government, Community, 
national and local, are empowered and obliged to offer protection to the Citizen. 
The Citizen should not be left vainly to strive to identify his or her source of 
protection as the process of market integration dissolves traditional State 
structures. The process of Market integration creates a need for the evolution of 
(at least) a kind of European administration. Structures of this nature are 
beginning to emerge. Yet, although piecemeal developments are occurring, the 
Treaty structure holds out only limited hope of planned development in that 
direction, even after the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union on 1 
November 1993. In sum: the Market has altered more rapidly than the State; how 
can this gulf be supervised? Here is the core of Federalism and Responsibility. 
Art. 8 EC. 
4 
II. Research Design and Methodology 
II.i. Part II ofthis Book; the FourSteps in the Original 
Project 
Federalism 
The original project was obliged to provide the Commission with very specific 
information about the identity, budget, telephone numbers etc. of agencies at the 
statutory, regional and local level which have competence in the field of product 
safety. At a more general level, the original project had to reconstruct the flow of 
information once an emergency situation occurs and to determine the criteria 
which influence the decision making process. The execution of the project was 
broken down into four steps, which are reflected within the national reports 
assembled in Part II of the book. 
1. An elaboration of the legal mechanisms which are employed to regulate 
product safety in emergency situations. This had already been achieved in the 
previous ZERP project for three of the countries (UK, Germany, Netherlands), 
but it remained to be accomplished for Portugal and Spain. 
2. An elaboration of the administrative structure and the organisation of the flow 
of information in the five Member States in cases of emergencies. A set of 
graphs has been worked out, which illuminates the way the law defines the 
structures, the flow of information and the decision-making process. 
3. The execution of case studies in emergency situations: it was the purpose of 
the case studies to contrast the "should-be structure" of the organisation, 
established at stage 2) above, with the "as it is structure" in concrete emergency 
situations - the gap between law and practice. One case study was undertaken 
in the field of technical consumer goods ("exploding office chairs"), the other in 
the field of foodstuffs ("contaminated Austrian wine"). The case studies 
reconstructed events from the first information about a possible risk up to the 
ultimate decision. The case studies are integrated into the national reports and 
the events are presented in flow charts. 
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4. Based on the preceding stages in the investigation of the "should be" and the 
"as it is" structure, interviews were conducted with competent officials in order 
to discover discrepancies between law and practice. The purpose was not simply 
to isolate such discrepancies where they occur, but also to begin to explain them. 
The accumulation of this "personal" data in addition to the information already 
assembled through the national reports, including the case studies, ensures a 
broader and deeper perception of developing practice in risk management in the 
five Member States, much of which escapes formal a priori legal categorisation. 
II. ii Part 1 of this Book; the European Level of Product Safety 
After the completion of the project we feit the need to extend the project design 
beyond its comparative borders and to integrate systematically the European 
dimension. The idea was to apply the same methodology at European level, with 
one exception; we were not able to prepare a fully developed case study. The 
extension of the project unfolded its own dynarnics. The results can be found in 
Part I of this book which is built on the data accumulated in the national reports, 
but is devoted to a much broader field of inquiry. 
Therefore, this book contains in Part I a much broader appreciation of the nature 
of European law applicable to product safety. "Federalism in Process" describes 
and analyses how and why the management of product safety contributes to the 
building of a European State. Existing organisational structures within the 
Member States are overruled by means of emergencies. They break the legal and 
administrative structures and pave the way for a redistribution of competences. 
The appearance of a quasi-federalist structure is accompanied by a reshaping of 
responsibilities between the Community and the Member States. The means to 
verify this leading hypothesis is a re-interpretation of Arts. 30/36 and a close 
analysis of the Directive on General Product Safety. 
II. iii The Supporting Graphs 
Presentation of data in the form of graphs ought to facilitate understanding of the 
several elements in the study. They draw together data gleaned from both 
national reports and interviews. The graphs are designed to permit comparison 
between theory and practice in the management of emergencies. They are also a 
basis for comparison between the States chosen for investigation. Moreover they 
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permit the reader to concentrate on particular aspects which are of major concem 
to him or her, simply by identifying a specific topic and tracing its appearance 
graph-by-graph, with the assistance of the explanatory legend. 
There are two types of graphs which have been employed; the 
ORGANISA TIONAL GRAPH and the FLOW CHART. The Organisational 
Graphs concentrate on the relationships between individual organisations. In 
combination, these graphs make clear the networks of communications, 
procedures for information exchange and accumulation of information and 
decision making. These graphs include presentation of the hierarchical structures 
and issues of competence. The Flow Charts should be read against the 
background of the Organisational Graphs. The Flow Charts demonstrate how the 
organisations contribute to the management of a problem at different points in 
time throughout the process. 
Although the national reports in Part II of this book will provide the reader with 
an adequate picture of the significantly different approaches taken by the 
Member States to product safety law and practice, the graphs will serve to 
highlight these differences in a more immediate and accessible form. This in turn 
will make it easier to grasp the background to the federalist notions which are 
the subject of examination in Part 1 of the book. 
III. How we have used Product Safety as a Window on broader Issues 
The general perception that product safety law and policy offered a window on 
to broader issues of Citizens' Rights and European State-building was the 
motivation to those involved in the accumulation of the material necessary for 
this project to pursue the project beyond the realms of information gathering. 
The case studies played a key role here. They made the "Europeanisation" of 
enforcement practice visible and comprehensible, due to their cross-border 
character and their cross-border cooperation. The development of product safety 
law and policy allows an appraisal of the allocation of responsibility for the 
management of product safety law and policy in an integrating market. State 
structures change under the influence of market restructuring. Whether that 
change is planned or not, willing or not, its occurrence has a direct impact on the 
citizen. This points towards broader questions which we feel are nothing less 
than the foundations of any current research into the law and practice of 
integration in Europe. This is Federalism and Responsibility. 
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The "Emergency" provides the focus for this study. The category of the 
emergency is enormously valuable as a motor for institutional restructuring. lt 
has its own inherent momentum. Systems require perpetual revision because 
they cannot prepare in advance to cover all possible occurrences. So the system 
contains within itself an unavoidable, though in detail unseen, capacity for 
change. Because the emergency, by its very definition, demands a new response, 
it carries with it the potential for challenging and changing existing institutional 
arrangements. Reform is then directed by the need for change generated by the 
emergency and the pressures brought to bear on the system. W e thus describe the 
emergency as capable of BREAKING the system - of forcing a re-
systematisation. 
That makes the process all the more challenging when a cross-border element is 
involved, because of the need to draw local, national and Community institutions 
into the process of re-definition. The cross-border emergency carries within it 
enormous potential for the generation of new solutions no longer confined by 
assumptions founded on and shaped by national institutional structures. The 
national systems are forced into a process of self re-evaluation where their 
experience in a European market context reveals inadequacy in existing national 
arrangements. 
This issue as developed in Part I of the book is important in itself; it is also 
important for its role as a window on much broader issues of Federalism and 
Responsibility. We insist in this book on a process of renewal which public 
authorities (govemmental, administrative and judicial) must confront for 
themselves when affected by the climate of European market integration. That 
nature of that renewal at national level will in turn heavily influence how the 
European State is built. 
We exarnine the potential clash between the flexibility required in "hands-on" 
product safety management and the more technical approach which the Member 
States themselves take to drawing up legal rules. The national reports reveal 
some very specific exarnples of gulfs between theory and practice in product 
safety management. Professionals involved in risk management are opposed to 
rigid rules which circumscribe their autonomy in dealing with particular issues. 
Y et, in elaborating a Community dimension to management, that resistance to 
rigid rules may come into collision with State concern to define exactly and 
cautiously what happens at Community level. There is here a close connection to 
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the modern deeper sensitivity to questions of Community competence among 
many Member States. 
The process of "Europeanisation" continues. Product safety has the potential to 
provide further insights. The next test will centre around the implementation of 
the General Directive on Product Safety2. That measure requires that only safe 
products shall be marketed within the Community. lt envisages that Member 
States shall have at their disposal a range of enforcement powers. The 
Commission too shall have certain, albeit limited, powers. The Directive also 
establishes permanent procedures for the rapid exchange of information. Already 
that Directive has provoked a challenge to its validity. Even the relatively narrow 
competence to act conferred on the Commission has led to a challenge by 
Germany3. Germany disputes the competence of the Council acting under 
Article 1 OOA to establish Community powers of the nature envisaged under the 
Directive. Germany considers that Article 9, the relevant provision, can be based 
only on Article 235. This would convert the voting rules in Council from 
qualified majority (Article lOOA) into unanimity (Article 235). Even before a 
study of the national response to implementation of the Directive is fully 
feasible, the Directive will have yielded a Court decision of potentially 
significant constitutional impact. In short, the litigation will yield further insights 
into the limits of European State-building against a background of a well-
developed European Market. That is, it is litigation which touches on the 
constitutional limits of State-building amid the economically inevitability of 
Market liberalisation. 
The next challenge to the establishment of a European product safety has already 
taken shape. Again Germany is taking the lead. lt refuses to implement the 
Directive because the Council has acted ultra vires in adopting the directive. As 
a defence Germany refers to the subsidiarity principle. The implementation of 
the directive would lead to an improvement of product safety in Germany. The 
subsidiarity principle is used here, as a means to escape the establishment of a 
European safety level and to maintain the lower national level. The federalist 
impact of the subsidiarity principle is striking and again it is product safety 
which is at the core of the issue. 
The disputes, once resolved, will act as another building brick in the reshaping of 
the European State in response to the re-shaping of the European Market. Legal 
decisions of this nature have an important role to play in this process. At the 
2 Dir. 92/59 OJ 1992 L228/24. 
3 Case C-359/92 OJ 1992 C288/10. 
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same time, the process is also driven by the activities of professionals, including 
risk managers, at national level. Their response to emergencies, which break 
existing structures and demand renewal of institutional arrangements and habits, 
also form part of the broad pattern of State-building. lt is a pattern which is 
strikingly well viewed through the window of Product Safety law and policy. 
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PART TWO: FEDERALISM AND RESPONSIBILITY -· THE 
BROADER PICTURE 
1. lntroduction - why "Federalism and Responsibility"? 
Federalism 
lt is increasingly appreciated that an adjustment of responsibility for regulating 
the market must follow the restructuring of the market itself through integration. 
If the Community is taking clear shape as a Market, its shape as a State is far less 
well-defined - and much more controversial. 
The perception that the market is changing and that such change demands an 
adjustment of the functions of public authorities responsible for regulating the 
market is, however, not more than a starting point. In fact, it is not more than the 
perception that has been plain to astute observers of the nature and purpose of 
the European Community for decades. Economic integration carries with it 
inevitable consequences for long-established assumptions about the 
"sovereignty" of nation States. 
This leads into discussion of issues which are conveniently grouped under the 
heading of "Federalism". Integration causes a redistribution of functions between 
different levels of govemment. Member States and the Community itself enter 
into a relationship which will be characterised, albeit frequently by implication 
only, by sharing out areas of action. That implies that each will have distinct 
responsibilities. The construction of a federalist structure drives one to ask where 
the location of responsibility may lie. These are responsibilities for the proper 
performance of governmental and/or administrative tasks; and they are 
responsibilities which are owed to individuals. In the Community, individuals 
are, since the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union on 1 
November 1993, both nationals of a particular Member State and also 
simultaneously Citizens of the European Union. This suggests a sharing of 
responsibility - perhaps even a doubling of responsibility. Yet, despite this 
rather grand dual status for over 350 million Europeans, federalism in Europe 
remains a rather nebulous, ill-defined concept in specific terms. The risk arises 
that responsibility too will lack a sharp outline. lf that occurs, then both 
nationality and citizenship will be difficult to transform into specific, enforceable 
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rights. The Market will be dominant; the State, at whatever level, will be 
diminished. This is the inquiry denoted by Federalism and Responsibility. 
II. Markets and Legal Systems 
The thesis of this book is that all limbs of the Member States of the Community 
are obliged to undergo reassessment of their roles in the light of the steady 
emergence of a Community Market and the rather more erratic emergence of a 
quasi-federalist Community State. This reassessment affects legislative, 
administrative and judicial arms of the State. An inquiry is demanded into all 
manifestations of State activity. Y et such an inquiry would overextend an essay 
of this nature. Accordingly examination will here be limited to the change in the 
role of the national judiciary in response to the development of the Community. 
The obligations cast on national judges provide a fine illustration of the 
renovation of traditional national approaches which follows from the evolution 
of the Community. Yet this serves as no more than an illustration, for such 
renovation is called for in all areas of State activity. Judges, like product safety 
managers and many other public officials, find their autonomy within the State 
compromised by the process of Community integration. Accordingly, it remains 
implicit, and on occasion explicit, in this inquiry that the State beyond its judicial 
structure is confronted by parallel questions about how to adapt to the process of 
economic integration. 
In the Community's legal order, the process of change which is naturally 
involved in consequence of membership of the Community has been strikingly 
reflected for well over thirty years. In Costa v ENEL 4 the Court explained that 
the very nature of the Community dictates the need for a legal system which is 
supreme: 
The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to 
another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardising the 
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty ... 
... the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could 
not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic 
legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as 
4 Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585. 
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Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being 
called into question. The transfer by the States from their domestic legal 
system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising 
under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign 
rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the 
concept of the Community cannot prevail..." 
The Community is a new legal order. lt has had transferred to it powers from 
national level. Accordingly and by way of corollary, national legal orders have 
also been subjected to a transformation. Their application is subject to the 
demands of the Community legal order. The search for sources of legal authority 
can no longer be directed solely at institutions intemal to a State. 
Inevitably such change in the perception of the place of the national legal order 
poses fundamentally important questions about the institutional make-up of the 
State. The impact of the Community goes far beyond constitutional legal 
questions. State structures which were built against a background assumption 
that a State has a degree of autonomy from pressures from outside the State's 
boundaries are plainly subjected to direct questions about their utility once the 
State's independence in legal, economic, political and perhaps even cultural 
terms is seen to be on the wane. 
The growth of a Community Market has plainly forced adjustment in the 
national State. But does a Community Market imply a Community State? There 
are many differing visions of precisely how the Community should respond to 
the process of market integration. These visions range from deregulatory 
preferences which would emphasise the elimination of national intervention in 
the market (a "no-State" at Community level) to a readiness to see the 
development of replacement Community-level regulatory instruments and 
institutions (the Community State). There are many nuances which would need 
tobe addressed in such an inquiry - neither Community "no-State" nor "State" 
are sufficiently sophisticated answers to the challenge of the Community Market. 
There is no need here to descend into the detail of such a debate to appreciate 
that membership of the Community forces a fresh examination of the nature and 
purpose of State functions and institutions. 
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III. The Court and the Development of the Constitutional Principles of the 
European Community 
The European Court has played a major role in moving the Community along a 
continuum from Market towards State. A well-known yet illuminating instance 
is supplied by the development of the constitutional principles of the Community 
legal order in a manner which has maximised their effective application through 
national procedures and fora. Although in Comet v Produktschap5 the Court 
declared that 
"it is for the national legal order of each Member State to designate the 
competent courts and to lay down the procedural rules for proceedings 
designed to ensure the protection of the rights which individuals acquire 
through the direct effect of Community law „.", 
that principle of "national procedural autonomy" has recently come to be 
perceived as subject to the increasingly prominent principle of "effectiveness". 
Drawn from Article 5, that principle requires authorities of Member States to act 
in support of Community objectives. In the case of courts, that means that the 
national judiciary must effectively protect claimed Community law rights. 
National procedural autonomy has been steadily eroded. EC law increasingly 
dictates what is required of national law in support of EC law rights. This EC 
influence dictates a need for adjustment of national legal approaches6. 
For example, in Factortame7 UK courts were held competent as a matter of EC 
law to award interim relief against the Crown, despite the absence of such a 
power under national law. The English House of Lords responded by disapplying 
an Act of Parliament, which represented an enormous break with English 
constitutional tradition8. This "effectiveness" jurisprudence has been developed 
by the European Court's November 1991 ruling in Francovich v Italian State9. 
Directive 80/987 required States to set up guarantee funds to compensate 
workers in the event of their employers' insolvency. Italy failed to implement the 
Directive. Francovich was a worker who would have been protected had the 
S Case 45176 [1976] ECR 2043. 
6 Bridge, Procec!ural Aspects of the Enforcement of EC Law through the Legal Systems of the Member 
States (1984) 9 ELRev 28; Barav and Green, Damages in the national courts for breach of Community 
law (1986) 6 YEL 55. 
7 Case C-213/89 [1990] ECR 1-2433. 
8 [1991) 1 All ER 70, [1990) 3 CMLR 375. Gravells, Effectjve Protection of Community Law Rights; 
Temporarv Disaoplication of an Act of Parliament [ 1991) Public Law 180. 
9 Cases C-6, C-9190 Francovich v lta!ian Statejudgment ofNovember 19, 1991[1993)2 CMLR 66. 
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Directive been implemented. No claim arose via direct effect, because the 
Directive did not satisfy the conditions for direct effectiveness. Nonetheless the 
Court was prepared to countenance a claim for compensation brought directly 
against the defaulting State. The Court observed that 
" ... the full effectiveness of Community provisions would be affected 
and the protection of the rights they recognise undermined if individuals 
were not able to recover damages when their rights were infringed by a 
breach of Community law attributable to a Member State." 
How wide the ruling in Francovich will prove to be remains a matter of 
conjecture10. But, at the very least, it seems inconceivable that it will apply only 
to failure to implement Directives. The European Court will have the chance to 
elaborate on such matters in Factortame (the sequel) and Firma Brasseries du 
Pecheurl 1, which concem violation of primary Treaty articles. The major test 
may prove to be the question of fault required for the purposes of Francovich 
liability. In any event, national legal orders will be obliged to rethink their rules 
relating to the financial liability of public authorities. The decision represents a 
further important element in the construction of the Community legal order and 
it demands a corresponding adjustment at national level. 
Two observations arise from this brief survey of the "principle of effectiveness" 
which are of particular relevance to the subject matter of this book. The first 
relates to the pains taken by the European Court to give real vitality to the EC 
legal order at national level. Direct effect, supremacy and, latterly, the principle 
of effectiveness, all underpined by the Article 177 preliminary reference 
procedure, testify to the Court's vigorous concem to maximise the impact of EC 
law rights and obligations. The second, albeit related point, concems the 
observation that the European Court is quite unafraid to demand in turn a 
vigorous response at national level. The Court expects national authorities -
here, judicial authorities - to act in the context of their EC law obligations. 
They are not able to retreat into national pattems of behaviour as an excuse for 
failure to support the Community. lt is Article 5 EC which forms the cornerstone 
of this obligation. lt supplies a vivid illustration of the changes required at 
national level as a result of the growth of the Community. 
10 Eg Caranta, Govemment Liability after Francovich [1993] 52 CU 272; Steiner, From Direct Effects 
to Francovich (1993) 18 ELRev 3; Ross, Beyond Francovjch (1993) 56 MLR 55; Fischer, 
Staatshaftung nach Gemeinschaftsrecht 2/1992 EuZW 41; Schockweiler, La responsabilite de 
l'autorite nationale en cas de violation du droit communautaire (1992) 28/1RTDE27. 
11 Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93 OJ 1993 C94/13. 
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IV. Constitutionalization - the Broader Picture 
The Court has latterly taken to declaring its hand. lt has become ever bolder in 
its depiction of the ambitious scope of the legal basis of the Comrnunity's 
objectives. In Opinion 1/91 on the Draft Agreement on a European Economic 
Area12, delivered on December 14, 1991, the European Court declared that 
" ... the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international 
agreement, nonetheless constitutes the constitutional charter of a 
Community based on the rule of law. [Emphasis added] 
The Court's use of the language of constitutions instead of international treaties 
is of the highest significance. 
In Opinion 1/91, the Court continued in terrns which were plainly an "updating" 
of the observations made thirty years before in the earliest major Community 
constitutional cases. Whereas in 1963 the Court referred in Van Gend en Loos 13 
to States joining the Community having limited their powers "albeit in limited 
fields", in 1991, in Opinion 1/91, it continued ( after the comment mentioned 
above) to insist instead on the States having "limited their sovereign rights, in 
ever wider fields". The Court was drawing attention here to a dynamic expansion 
in Community competence for which the Court itself can claim significant 
responsibility. 
The Court's "constitutionalisation" of the Treaty in Opinion 1/91 was a 
culmination of other important early developments in this direction. For 
example, in Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v European Parliament14 the Court 
broadened its judicial review function beyond the textual limitations in Article 
173. The Treaty did not explicitly allow review of acts of the Parliament; the 
Court nonetheless invoked the rule of law and allowed such review on the basis 
that Community institutions should not be able to avoid review of the validity of 
measures against the "basic constitutional charter, the Treaty" 15. Even in the 
light of these earlier developments, Opinion 1/91 was a major advance, both in 
its broad commitments to the notion of the Treaty as Constitution, but also in the 
12 [1992] l CMLR 245. 
13 Case 26/62 [1963] ECR !. 
14 Case 294/83 [1986] ECR 1339. 
l S Post-Maastricht, this loophole has been partially plugged; Art.173 EC now envisages review of the 
Parliament's acts where adopted jointly with the Council or where intended to produce legal effects 
vis-a-vis third parties. 
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impact made by the specific outcome of the Opinion. The Court ruled that the 
draft Agreement on the European Economic Area was incompatible with the 
acquis communautaire because of its capacity to dilute the integrity of the 
Community legal order. The Court thus took a high-profile opportunity to 
demonstrate its determination not to see a weakening of a constitutional structure 
which it had spent many years enlarging and strengthening. Accordingly the 
Agreement had tobe renegotiated16. 
In sum, in the celebrated terms of Eric Stein, the Court has construed the 
Treaties "in a constitutional mode rather than employing the traditional 
international law methodology" 17. 
The description of the Treaty as a Constitution carries with it the implication that 
there are too Constitutional Courts. Naturally, one ofthem is the European Court 
itself. The Court finds itself increasingly subjected to examination as a 
Constitutional Courtl8. lt carries out functions of constitutional review. These 
include the defence of individual rights in challenges to the validity of acts made 
by Community authorities. They also include the determination of debates about 
competence between States and the Community. But national courts too become 
constitutional courts by virtue of the principles of direct effect and supremacy. 
National courts are expected to uphold Community law rights, if necessary 
refusing to apply conflicting rules emanating from national authorities. Rights 
deriving from the apparently "non-State" source which is the European 
Community have a very real impact within the systems of the individual 
Member States. Nationals of Member States may invoke Community norms to 
confine the freedom of action of States. Those nationals of the Member States 
are after all simultaneously Citizens of the European Union! Through this 
process the European Community begins to develop characteristics typically 
found in more traditional States, whereas the States themselves lose the 
"sovereignty" associated in the past with Statehood. In fact, there is a 
rearrangement of functions between different levels of government, 
international, national and indeed regional or local. lt is this recurrent issue of 
division of function which leads naturally to contemplation of the modern 
Community from the perspective of federalism. lt is once again apparent that the 
16 The renegotiated agreement was approved by the Court in Opinion 1/92 [1992) 2 CMLR 217, 10 
April 1992. 
17 Eric Stein Lawyers Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution (1981) 75 Amer J Jnt L 1. 
18 eg Weiler, The Transformation ofEurope (1991) 100 Yale LJ 2403; Jacobs, Is the Court of Justice of 
the Eurooean Comrnunities a Constitutional Court? in Curtin and O'Keeffe Constitutional 
Adjudication in European Community and National Law (1992); Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the 
Many Faces of Federalism (1990) 38 AJCL 25; Rinze, The role of the European Court of Justice as a 
Federal Constitutional Court [1993] Public Law 426. 
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development of the Community forces re-thinking of the nature and purpose of 
the State in Europe. 
V. The Community: Beyond the Economy 
The impact of such questions has become ever more profound as the Community 
has developed. The perception of the scope of the Community's functions has 
shifted. lt was lang perceived that economic integration was the core of 
Community activity. lt was, after all, the "European Economic Community" 
which was the most important of the three Communities established during the 
1950s19. The Community was above all a market. True, the original Treaty 
contained a Social Policy Title20. However, this was severely limited in its 
scope. The focus of the Community was the development of market integration. 
Latterly, however, the Community has become much more closely associated 
with discourse resembling Statehood rather than simply a market. The alteration 
in the title of the European Economic Community to simply "European 
Community", achieved by the Treaty on European Union which came into force 
on 1 November 1993, is symbolic of that shift2I. So too, in turn, is the status of 
the European Community as one pillar in the European Union. The Treaty on 
European Union has created a three-pillar structure, under which the Union 
comprises the European Community and two areas of inter-governmental 
cooperation, in Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Horne 
Affairs22. 
There are more concrete manifestations of the Community's rising profile. The 
Community has taken a much more active role in developing common policies. 
The additional competences conferred on the Community by the Single 
European Act, such as Environmental Policy, represent a clear manifestation of 
the Community's expansion. In fact, as is well known, such express additions to 
the Community's competences were no more than recognition of much that was 
already happening in practice23. The Community has lang been prone to 
19 Tue other two were the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community. 
20 Articles 117-128 of the original EEC Treaty, encompassing a Chapter on Social Provisions and a 
Chapter on the European Social Fund. 
21 Art. G.A Treaty on European Union. 
22 Titles V & VI Treaty on European Union respectively. 
23 Usher in Smythe and White (eds.), Current Issues in European and International Law (1990), Ch.!. 
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embellish the apparent Treaty focus on market integration with activity in wider 
fields. Both political and judicial arms have contributed to this evolution24. 
Parallel observations rnay be made about the Treaty on European Union, where, 
sirnilarly, new competences, such as Consumer Policy, are to a significant extent 
reflections of existing practice25. 
Here too the Cornmunity is moving into fields which cannot be separated from 
functions associated with Statehood. Once again, this cornmentary need not 
occasion surprise. One can go back to the early perspectives on Cornmunity 
development and identify an awareness that the Cornmunity would develop far 
beyond a process of econornic cooperation and integration. In a rather well-
known comment in May 1950, Robert Schurnan, then French Foreign Minister 
and a major impulse in the early development of European integration, declared 
that 
"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. lt 
will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto 
solidarity. The corning together of the nations of Europe requires the 
elirnination of the age old opposition of France and Germany. Any 
action taken must in the first place concem these two countries. With 
this airn in view, the French Govemrnent proposes to take action 
irnmediately on one lirnited but decisive point. lt proposes to place 
Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole under a 
common higher authority, within the framework of an organization 
open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling 
of coal and steel production should imrnediately provide for the setting 
up of common foundations for econornic development as a first step in 
the federation of Europe ... The solidarity in production thus established 
will make it plain that war between France and Germany becornes not 
merely unthinkable, but materially impossible ... " 
This has been characterised as a "functionalist" view - that the EC will develop 
function by function, rather than according to some elaborate pre-set agenda. For 
many early functionalists the whole point of the Cornmunity process was that 
once started, it could not be stopped. The spillover process was bound to lead to 
a further redistribution of functions between the Cornmunity and its Member 
24 Environmental Protection provides a good example; the Single European Act inserted a title on 
Environmental Protection, but the Court in Case 240/83 ADBHU [1985] ECR 531 bad already 
declared that environmental protection is "one of the Community's essential objectives". Already too 
the Community was developing environmental legislation on the basis of Arts.100 and 235. 
25 Art.129a EC. Weatherill and Micklitz, Consumer Policy in the European Community: Before and 
After Maastricht (1993) Journal of Consumer Policy, 285 et seq. 
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States resulting in a curtailment of the latter's powers in an evolving international 
environment. Not only was the steady incremental growth the whole point, its 
inevitability was the whole attraction. 
Functionalist perspectives embraced appreciation of econornic imperatives in the 
integrative process and - the neofunctionalist gloss - political imperatives too26. 
However, one certainly did not need tobe a functionalist to accept that market 
integration through law would pose vital and complex questions about the future 
of political structures in Western Europe. However one prioritised the roles of 
political and economic impulses in developing the Community27, it was plain 
that institutional and constitutional change was afoot from the very early days of 
the Community. However, the comment that fierce debate, at the very least, is 
historically inevitable is little comfort to those who have to find practical 
solutions! 
VI. The Treaty on European Union - the hidden State outside the EC 
The three-pillar structure of the Treaty on European Union deserves brief further 
attention from the perspective of the shifting notion of the State. The European 
Union comprises the European Community and two areas of inter-governmental 
cooperation, in Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Horne 
Affairs. The Title on Justice and Horne Affairs is especially intriguing. lt 
envisages cooperation between States on matters relevant to security. Terrorism 
and drug trafficking were widely cited as principal reasons for the need for 
deeper cooperation. The absence of intra-Community borders offers the 
opportunity for free movement of not only "economically desirable" migrants 
but also "politically undesirable" individuals. The States have accordingly set up 
control mechanisms at the European level to ensure monitoring; to ensure public 
control of the Market. 
Initially, this appears comparable to the question of how to control "undesirable" 
(unsafe) products in an integrated market - a question of "Europeanisation" of 
State structures in response to the maturing of the Market. However in fact there 
are major distinctions which must be drawn. The EC structure, within which 
26 Eg Linclberg, Tue Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (OUP, 1963); Haas, ~ 
Uniting of Europe: Politica] Social and Economic Forces. 1950-1957 (Stanford, USA, 2nd Ed„ 
1968). 
27 A matter intensely analysed by many theorists; for a valuable overview see Pinder, European 
Community (Oxford, 1991). 
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product market regulation is being developed, is by no means a fully-fledged 
State, but it has certain elements which are of a recognisable quasi-State nature. 
For example, the Commission has supervisory and administrative powers. Both 
it and other institutions are subject to the control of the European Court, a court 
of constitutional review. The European Parliament provides a democratic input 
into the EC structure, albeit that it has a rather weak voice in the legislative 
procedure. Yet in the area of Justice and Horne Affairs what has been created at 
European level is rather mysterious. The intergovernmental pillars of the Treaty 
on European Union are not inserted into the EC structure and are not subject to 
the direct control of the EC institutions28. The institutional arrangements for 
monitoring people which are undoubtedly growing at European level in response 
to Market integration seem intransparent. 
The three-pillar, rather ungainly structure of the European Union highlights the 
multi-fäcetted and frankly peculiar nature of the job done at Maastricht29 . The 
Union envisaged at Maastricht is not yet a coherent blueprint for a "European 
State". The perplexing structure built at Maastricht is neatly exemplified by the 
fact that Citizenship of the Union is inserted into the Community Treaty30. 
lt is far from clear how the Citizens of the European Union can effectively 
exercise rights in the environment of intergovemmental cooperation in Justice 
and Horne Affairs. lt is an area where the European Court of Justice, the 
Constitutional Court, has no clear jurisdiction. That exclusion, coupled to the 
intransparency of the whole process of cooperation, seems likely to weaken the 
practical value of the commitment made by the Union to respect fundamental 
rights as guarantied by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and as drawn from constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States31 . The European Constitution here looks rather ragged! Equally, the 
development of intergovernmental cooperation in the field of Justice and Horne 
Affairs raises questions about how to supervise conformity with the European 
Convention by the individual Member States. This is another testing ground for 
evaluating the growth of Federalist structures in Europe; it seems that it is an 
area where Responsibility will be even more difficult to allocate than in the field 
of product market integration. 
28 For some arguments that they should be see Vercher, Terrorism in Europe: An International 
Comparative Legal Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
29 For a powerful critique, see Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the UnioO' A Europe of Bits and 
Pieces (1993) 30 CMLRev 17. 
30 Art.8 EC. 
31 Art.F(2) Treaty on European Union. 
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VII. The Market without a State 
What has been portrayed above is the State and the Market in flux at national 
and at Community level. This book is presented on the premise that there 
remains a process which is incomplete. The short historical survey provided 
above reveals no more than the persistence of questions about how to reorganise 
institutions in response to the process of integration. The label "Market without a 
State" helpfully encapsulates the problem32. The process of negative integration 
is rapidly creating a European market. The application of provisions such as 
Articles 30, 48 and 59 undermines the pursuit of traditional State functions in 
favour of a liberalised, deregulated market at European level. In some areas 
Community legislative activity has set up institutions of a proto-State nature at 
the European level. In other areas little or nothing of this nature has been 
undertaken. The details need not be pursued here. The point is that even in so far 
as some institutional features have emerged which rnight be associated with 
European State-building, that process lags far behind the construction of the 
Market. 
Where and how should a European State begin to emerge? Where does it link to 
a European Market? How much beyond the European Market must the 
Community extend in order to fulfil its tasks? This is the great debate in the 
Community. Many observers have adopted fiercely opposing positions in 
assessing the appeal of the many proposed models of institutional and 
constitutional restructuring. Y et none would doubt the fundamental need to 
confront the question. 
As already elaborated above, this has always been the great debate in the 
Community. Rather excitingly, it has latterly become a very high-profile issue 
discussed by rnillions of people outside the political elites of the Member States 
and the Community. As is well known, the debate which followed the agreement 
on the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht in December 1991 became 
heated. lt fuelled a fierce and often ill-tempered examination of the future of 
Europe and of the individual States within it. Pressure groups "Europeanised" 
themselves even as part of a strategy of opposing Europeanisation. British 
opponents of the Treaty travelled to Denmark to support the "anti-Maastricht" 
campaigners in the Danish referendum33. Ultimately, by the late summer of 
32 Joerges, Markt ohne Staat? Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Gemeinschaft und die Renaissance der 
regulativen Politik, in: Wildenmann (ed.) Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen einer Europäischen 
Union, 1991, 254 et seq. 
33 lt is a moot point whether this intervention helped or hindered the cause of Danish opposition. 
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1993, eleven Member States had ratified the Treaty. Attention turned to the 
twelfth, Germany, specifically to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, its Federal 
Constitutional Court. 
VIII. Bundesverfassungsgericht/ Federal Constitutional Court 
VIII. i. The Decision in Context 
lt is difficult to know how much weight to attach to the ruling of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court on October 12, 1993 which paved the way for 
German ratification of the Treaty on European Union and its subsequent coming 
into force on 1 November 1993. On a strict legal reading, it is no more than a 
court in one of the twelve Member States expressing its view on the validity of 
ratification of the Treaty with that State's constitutional order. On this minimalist 
view, the outcome favourable to German ratification34 has no formal 
repercussion beyond Germany, apart from the simple fact that Germany was 
then enabled to ratify the Treaty, thereby allowing it to come into force. 
Formally the Court was speaking for the German constitutional legal order 
alone. 
Politically, the decision is likely to exert an effect of a rather broader, if 
intangible, nature. The Constitutional Court had much to say about its perception 
of the present state and the future potential of the Community. This is likely to 
be digested by a range of consumers. The German government will have to plan 
its future strategy for Community development with an eye to the comments of 
its Constitutional Court. That will inevitably spill over into the wider political 
environment of the Community, in so far as it affects Germany's negotiating 
stance. Indeed, some of the views expressed by the Constitutional Court may 
find adherents among Germany's partners. 
The addressees of the Constitutional Court's decision were doubtless not only 
political. The European Court of Justice is intimately aware of the need to 
maintain the support of national courts in order to ensure the continued practical 
observance of Community law. In this sense the European Court, in building a 
workable judicial structure for the Community, has no choice but to accept 
inputs from national level and, to some extent, to adjust its jurisprudence to 
34 Fora similar position of the French Cour de Cassation, cf. Oliver, Tue French Constitution and the 
Treaty of Maastricht, International and comparative Law Quaterly, (43) 1994, 1 et seq. 15. 
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accord with what national courts are prepared to support. The views of the 
German Constitutional Court are bound tobe read with care in Luxembourg. 
For the present purposes, we approach the ruling as another contribution to the 
debate on Statehood in Europe. From that perspective it is an intriguingly multi-
layered decision. 
Vlll.ii The Competence of the European Community 
The overriding feel of much of the ruling is that the German Constitutional Court 
has taken a remarkably narrow approach to the Community's competence. lt 
approaches the Treaty very much as a technical document which confers powers 
on the Community only in defined areas. The ruling is based firmly on the key 
role of the notion of enumerated powers as the basis of Community competence; 
"Der EU-Vertrag und insbesondere der EG-Vertrag folgen dem Prinzip der 
begrenzten Einzelermächtigung"35. 
Yet it is a much remarked-on phenomenon that the practice of the Community is 
to treat the notion of enumerated powers as rather flexible. lt serves as a 
theoretical limit on Community competence which plays a rather hidden role in 
practice. The Court has steadily broadened the interpretation of the principles of 
primary Community law. Articles 5 EC and 7 EEC/6 EC, for example, have a 
pervasive effect in national legal orders. In the realm of secondary legislation, 
the confining principle that the Community has lirnited, enumerated powers 
under the Treaty holds true in theory. In practice the Community's enumerated 
powers are very wide. Article 235, linked to Articles 2 and 3, in particular, but 
also Article 100 and later Article 1 OOA, have been used as the basis of wide 
ranging expansion of Community competence36. The Treaty has been 
transformed by word and deed into the Constitution of a Community based on 
the rule of law. lt is only partly comprehensible as a structure confined by 
enumerated powers. Yet the ruling of the German Constitutional Court strikingly 
avoids recognition of the dynamic and evolving nature of European Court 
jurisprudence and broader Community policy making. 
35 Weiler, Transformation ofEurope. (1991), Yale LJ 2403. 
36 Usher, The Continuing Development of Law and !nstitutions in Academy of European Law (ed.), 
Collected Courses Vol.11, Book !, ppl48-150, 163-165 (Art.100), pp160-162 (Art.lOOa), pplS0-153, 
163-165 (Art.235); Weatherill, Beyond Preemption?· Shared Competence and Constitutional Change 
in the European Community in O'Keeffe and Twomey (eds.), Legal !ssues of the Maastricht Treaty 
(Chancery, 1994). 
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lt would not be difficult for the EC lawyer to be rather critical of the pale 
reflection of EC law and policy which emerges from this ruling. That rnight be to 
overlook the subtle structure of the ruling. The result should not be ignored. The 
Constitutional Court ruled in favour of ratification by Germany. The Court 
thereby ensured the ratification of the Treaty by the last of the twelve Member 
States and secured the corning into force of the Treaty. lt brought to life aspects 
of the Treaty on European Union such as Citizenship of the Union, Econornic 
and Monetary Union and enhanced areas of common policy making such as 
Consumer Protection. From the strategic point of view, one rnight reflect that the 
German Constitutional Court was obliged to take a rather technical approach in 
its description of Community competence, for it otherwise would have found it 
well-nigh impossible to resist the claim that the rights of the individual enshrined 
under the German Constitution were threatened by ratification ofthe Treaty. 
This is not to suggest that the German Court chose to misrepresent the nature of 
EC law in order to secure the result it wished to achieve, namely ratification. The 
point made here is that this ruling has many nuances in its application to 
conceptions of the State and related phenomena at national and at international 
level. That itself is a pointer to the different imprints left on developing 
European Statehood by different actors. 
Another layer to the decision of the German Constitutional Court is the sense 
that the Court is not simply describing an EC which it views as fettered behind 
strict bars of competence via the principle of enumerated powers. The Court also 
appears to be "warning" the Community (doubtless including the European 
Court) of the jurisdictional lirnits beyond which it should not step. lndeed the 
ruling observes that purported activity beyond competence lirnits will simply not 
be effective - "eine solche Auslegung von Befugnisnormen würde für 
Deutschland keine Bindungswirkung entfalten." The response in Luxembourg 
will of course be neither direct nor explicit. Y et such observations will not go 
ignored. 
VllI.iii.Judicial Dialogue and the development of the 
European Community 
lt bears further repetition that even if one is correct to judge that the 
Constitutional Court is issuing a warning about future activity, there is no call to 
overstate the <langer inherent in such tension. There are previous examples of 
national courts and the European Court engaging in a dialogue about the nature 
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and effect of Community law37. These deserve brief recollection as examples of 
the potentially creative process which may be initiated by an initially apparently 
serious difference of opinion. 
The French Conseil d'Etat was notoriously unwilling to accept the European 
Court's view that Directives were capable of direct effect. In Cohn Bendit38, a 
ruling of 22 December 1978, it simply refused to pay due heed to relevant 
European Court judgments39. lt considered Directives incapable of indirect 
effect and declined to make a reference under Article 177(3) on the point. In 
(indirect) response, the European Court was necessarily astute to the limits of its 
capacity to cajole recalcitrant national courts into compliance. lt responded in 
due course by offering partial appeasement. lt maintained that Directives were 
capable of direct effect against the State, but ruled that they were not capable of 
direct effect in relations between private parties40. One may have one's doubts 
about the desirability of this distinction, which anomalously restricts the sphere 
of application of unimplemented Directives41, but the result was the termination 
of rebellion at national level as the French courts have adjusted to the refined 
expectations of the European Court42. The Community legal order here 
developed perhaps erratically, but through a process involving conciliation. 
A further example is provided by the background to the development of 
fundamental rights by the European Court as part of the Cornmunity legal order. 
In developing the implications of the doctrine of supremacy, the European Court 
ruled that Community law overrides even national constitutionally protected 
rights43 . Such a ruling leaves the Community system vulnerable to charges that it 
strips away individual protection to a degree unacceptable in a modern 
democracy. This perception conforms to the thematic pattern of a Cornmunity 
Market which develops in a manner which diminishes the national State, where 
fundamental rights have been protected in the past, but which yearns in vain for 
the construction of a European State which would assume responsibility for 
fundamental rights protection44. The German courts, in particular, reacted with 
37 See generally Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1986), especially Chapter 10. 
38 [1979] Dall.Jur. 155; [1980] l CMLR 543. 
39 Such as Case 33/70 SACE [1970] ECR 1213 and Case 41174 Van Duyn v Horne Office [1974] ECR 
1337. 
40 Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 723. 
41 Cf., eg, comments by Reich, Europäisches Verbraucherschutzrecht (Nomos, 1993) para.198. 
42 Summarised in Weatherill and Beaumont, EC Law (Penguin Books, 1993), pp.323-325. 
43 Case 11170 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
44 This in turn poses questions about the relationship between the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the expanding EC structure; a further aspect of the complexity of building a European 
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hostility to the European Court's contentious expansion of the implications of the 
doctrine of supremacy. In "Solange 1"45 they expressed an intent to reserve to 
themselves the competence to test Community Jaw against German 
constitutional norms. On its face such a ruling represents a major threat to the 
supremacy of Community law and therefore to the integrity of the Community 
legal order. Y et the European Court subsequently developed a catalogue of 
fundamental rights as part of the Community legal structure to the point where in 
"Solange II"46 the German courts expressed willingness to abandon their 
previous reservations in the light of the adequate protection of fundamental 
rights through the Community system. Both national and Community legal 
systems were renewed under the influence of participation in the Community 
structure. 
These are merely illustrations and both are admittedly somewhat simplified. 
Nonetheless they demonstrate that the national courts and the European Court 
are capable of embarking on an indirect dialogue about points of concern which 
may be resolved to mutual satisfaction by adjustments on both sides. National 
courts and European Court can develop a kind of savoir-vivre. 
This is no sense to treat the ruling of the Constitutiona1 Court as a minor matter. 
Its implications are hard to foresee, however optirnistic one may be about the 
capacity of the Community legal order to absorb and to respond to the concerns 
expressed therein. Y et here there is evidence that the courts of the States and of 
the Community are capable of engaging in a process of renewal to meet each 
other's concerns. The legal order can be reshaped as problems arise. That is a 
perception which we in this book wish to translate beyond the field of the legal 
order alone. lt touches administrative structures. The developing process of 
reshaping can be examined in the specific field of product safety management. 
Much more broadly, it can be observed in the general phenomenon of European 
State-building. 
VIII. iv. States and Democracy 
Perhaps the Bundesverfassungsgericht deserves the final comment in this sub-
section. If its principal message involves an instruction to national and to 
State. Yet further complication is offered by the role of cooperation on Justice and Horne Affairs, 
outside the EC but within the EU. 
45 [1974] 2CMLR549. 
46 [1987] 2CMLR225. 
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Community authorities to take care in an attempt to transform a non-State entity 
into a quasi-State entity, then it is a message that deserves tobe heard. That point 
is indeed one closely linked to the message of this book; that the creation of a 
type of Federal structure in Europe must be accompanied by an appreciation of 
the importance of the allocation of Responsibility47 . These are the closing 
comments in the Constitutional Court's ruling: 
"Entscheidend ist somit sowohl aus vertraglicher wie aus verfassungs-
rechtlicher Sicht, daß die demokratischen Grundlagen der Union 
schritthaltend mit der Integration ausgebaut werden und auch im 
Fortgang der Integration in den Mitgliedstaaten eine lebendige 
Demokratie erhalten bleibt." 
IX. Beyond the Treaty on European Union 
This debate may have run out of steam in the specific context of the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union. The gap of almost two years between agreement 
being reached on the Treaty in Maastricht in December 1991 and its eventual 
corning into force on 1 November 1993 lead to weariness and a kind of 
"Maastricht-fatigue". The Treaty is in force and that has, superficially, closed 
that part of the debate. But the issues have absolutely not been resolved. The 
Treaty on European Union has readjusted the nature of the Community and, as 
inevitable corollary, the nature of the Member States too. Y et it is not a final 
readjustment. Indeed, it cannot be a final readjustment, because the process of 
econornic and political integration does not stand still. In fact, the process carries 
its own momentum. One alteration in the constitutional or institutional 
framework immediately creates fertile ground for the next alteration. The 
process must be repeated, because the structures of the European and the 
national state continue to fluctuate and therefore continue to demand attention. 
That is a perception which held true in a Community of six Member States and 
which applies with all the more force in the Community of twelve. The process 
continues. The Community is on the threshold of yet further expansion, which 
will itself force further institutional and constitutional reconsideration. 
The process of establishing Monetary Union provides an illustration of a matter 
which appears in need of renewed attention. This seemed to have been planned 
47 Cf. Fora similar position of the French Cour de Cassation, Oliver, loc.cit. 14. 
28 
Federalism 
in the Maastricht Treaty, with a timetable leading smoothly to a single currency 
by, at the latest, 1 January 199948. Y et the plans are now badly disrupted. The 
Treaty commitment seemed unfeasible in practice even in advance of the coming 
into force of the Treaty as a result of the turmoil on international currency 
markets through 1992 and 1993 which destabilised the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the European Monetary System. lt is probable that the whole 
issue will have to be reopened at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, with 
Treaty amendment highly likely. 
In other areas, an amendment in one round of Treaty negotiation may conclude 
the pursuit of a particular aspect of a policy. Y et that may itself open up future 
possibilities for wider activity in the field in question. For example, the Single 
European Act finally established the place of Environmental Protection in the 
Treaty framework. Inevitably, that was but a start. In the Treaty on European 
Union the Environmental provisions have been developed still further49. The 
lesson is that the Community does not stand still. Policy shift breeds further 
policy shift. 
However, there are threads which link such debate about the development of the 
Community. We have identified as one of those threads Federalism and 
Responsibility. 
X. Competence, Subsidiarity, Federalism and 
Responsibility 
X.i. Competence 
The question of the respective competences of the Community and its Member 
States was mentioned above in connection with the ruling of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. lt is possible to chart a general drift by which the 
Community has developed an enhanced competence50. This drift has been 
induced by a broad interpretation by the Court of the ambit of many Treaty 
provisions in combination with a willingness among the political institutions to 
adopt legislation in very many fields rather distant from the Community's "core" 
economic activities. 
48 Arts. !02a - 109m EC. 
49 Arts. l 30r-t EC. 
50 Part VIII.ii, infra XXVI. 
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Article 235, in particular, has been used as the basis for legislation which rnight 
appear rather remote from the Community's objectives. Nevertheless, a 
challenge to the competence of the Community to use Article 235 has never been 
initiated before the Court51 . The principal reason probably lies in Article 235's 
requirement of a unanimous vote in Council. Each State retains a political check 
on the Community's legislative ambitions in the shape of an effective veto in 
Council. However, the increasing availability of legal bases which require only 
qualified majority voting has deprived States of a check on Community 
competence through a veto in Council. Article lOOA, the internal market 
provision inserted by the Single European Act, is highly significant in this 
regard. Accordingly questions of competence have become increasingly 
sensitive. 
X.ii. Subsidiarity 
Sensitivity over the scope of Community competence provoked the debate 
summarised by the slogan "Subsidiarity". Subsidiarity stands out as a key 
component of the agreement on the Treaty on European Union reached at 
Maastricht in December 1991. lndeed, a year later, it again played a major role 
in brokering agreement between the Member States at the Edinburgh European 
Council in December 1992. That meeting was designed to allay national 
(especially British and Danish) fears about the Treaty on European Union and to 
encourage ratification by all twelve Member States. The recurring invocation of 
the "magic word", Subsidiarity, is a powerful illustration of the suggestion made 
above that agreement at Maastricht settled some matters, but opened up many 
more for debate. Maastricht sowed seeds which will ripen and call for further 
attention. 
Subsidiarity was reduced to a legal formula which was deemed appropriate for 
insertion into the EC Treaty. According to the new Article 3B EC 
"The Community shall act within the lirnits of the powers conferred 
upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
51 Although there are instances of challenges to the validity of reliance on Art.235 in preference to other 
specific Treaty bases; eg Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493. 
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subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty." 
This is magnificently evasive. An exhaustive examination of the issues raised by 
this new provision would be fruitless52. Indeed, it would be impossible. 
Subsidiarity under Article 3B opens up scope for a debate about competence, 
inter alia perhaps before the European Court of Justice. lt does not resolve the 
debate. Nevertheless, the gaps in Article 3B which call to be filled might 
profitably be identified. They are gaps which reflect the gaps referred to in this 
book in the context of Federalism and Responsibility. 
The first paragraph of Article 3B must be taken to refer to the notion of 
enumerated powers. The Community has lirnits to its competence and those 
limits are defined by the Treaty. Accordingly - and here one may note the 
sensitivity in this issue - the Member States' own competences are also defined 
by the limits of the Treaty. Yet this picture immediately raises the critical 
question - where precisely do those limits lie? lt is well known that the Treaty 
lacks a specific list and that, moreover, the Community/Member State 
competence divide is not static. lt shifts - typically in favour of the 
Community. The first paragraph of Article 3B simply rehearses a fundamental 
complexity in the Treaty structure without in any way resolving it. 
The first phrase of the second paragraph of Article 3B adds to the impression 
that the subsidiarity principle is being laid on foundations which are already 
unstable. That phrase refers to the Community's "exclusive competence"; yet no 
authoritative list of precisely what falls within the Community's exclusive 
competence exists. Nor, given the shifting margin of Community/State 
competence, could such a list exist! 
52 Among a torrent of comment, see, eg, Emiliou, Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier against "the 
Entemrises of Ambition"? (1992) 17 ELRev 383; Lord Mackenzie Stuart, Subsidiarity - A Busted 
Flush? Curtin and O'Keefe (eds.), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National 
Law (Butterworths Ireland, 1992); Subsidiarity: the Challenge of Change Proceedings of the Jacques 
Delors Colloquium 1991 (Maastricht, EIPA, 1991); Micklitz, The Maastricht Treaty. the principle of 
subsidiarity and the theory of integration Lakimies, The periodical of the Finnish lawyers, special 
issue on European integration, 4/93, 508 et seq. 
31 
H. - W. Micklitz I St. Weatherill 
The second paragraph of Article 3B promises forbiddingly difficult calculation. 
The notion which underlies this paragraph is not difficult to grasp. lt implies a 
kind of "efficiency" test; an assessment of the "best level" for action in a 
particular sector of activity. The application of such a test would seem to fall 
within the province of politicians and/or administrators. Yet its appearance in 
Article 3B offers it up to the judges as a legal norm against which the validity of 
Community acts may be tested. This is a legal "test" which seem scarcely 
capable of coherent application by a court. 
Article 3B is evasive because it reflects the problem of dividing competences 
between Community and Member States instead of attempting directly to 
address it. This is the reason why it represents a continuation of the competence 
debate, not its resolution. 
At the Edinburgh European Council of December 1992, the Conclusions of the 
Presidency included an Overall Approach to the Application by the Council of 
the Subsidiarity Principle and Article 3B of the European Union. This asserts 
that 
"subsidiarity is a dynarnic concept and should be applied in the light of 
the objectives set out in the Treaty. lt allows Community action to be 
expanded where circumstances so require, and conversely, to be 
restricted or discontinued where it is no longer justified." 
This observation deepens scepticism about the justiciability of the subsidiarity 
principle. lt conforms much more closely to an expression of political concern 
about competence division, rather than to a constitutional legal norm53 . 
Similarly, from the Edinburgh Conclusions: 
"Community measures should leave as much scope for national 
decision as possible, consistent with securing the aim of the measure 
and observing the requirements of the Treaty. While respecting 
Community law, care should be taken to respect well-established 
national arrangements and the organisation and working of Member 
States' legal systems„." 
X.iii. Federalism 
Questions of the respective competences of the Community and its Member 
States have thus assumed a dominant place on the Community agenda. These are 
53 Cf. Case C-359/92 OJ 1992 C288/l 0. 
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classically questions addressed by all emergent federations. Subsidiarity is, in 
fact, itself a shorthand for questions about competence division, which is in turn 
inextricably 1inked with the federalist process. This renders all the more peculiar 
the determination of the UK at Maastricht to delete all reference to the term 
"federalism" from the Treaty on European Union while simultaneously seizing 
on the inclusion of the term "subsidiarity" as a major success54. 
lt is not surprising that the evolution of the Community Market has forced 
attention to be devoted to such topics. Yet the inability to solve such problems in 
a convincing and clear manner means inevitably that they will have to be 
addressed on an ad hoc basis in particular areas of Community activity. 
X.iv. Responsibility 
The identification of allocation of competence as a key problem area establishes 
a connection with the prob lern area of allocation of Responsibility. lt is plain 
from the discussion above that allocation of competence is not a precise science; 
nor is allocation of responsibility. There are areas where it is unclear precisely 
who may act. If it is not clear who has the competence to legislate to address a 
problem then it is not clear who bears responsibility should things go awry. Put 
simply, an injured party needs to know where the buck stops in order to seek 
redress. But where the fixing of responsibility is obscured by the imprecision of 
competence allocation, the buck may not stop anywhere. Responsibility may 
vanish into a "black hole", the chasm between State and market. 
This picture throws up several layers of complexity. Community law of market 
integration may confine State competence to act, yet the Community itself may 
legally (because of lack of competence) or politically (because of the inability to 
secure a constitutionally adequate majority in Council) find itself unable to fill 
that gap. Even where the Community is able to act, there are important limits to 
the capacity for empowering Community institutions with "State" functions. 
In such circumstances the notion that the "State" assumes responsibility for 
regulating the market breaks down. The "State" at national level is restricted in 
its capacity for action by obligations arising under primary Community law. For 
54 Domestic perceptions explain this; for the present at least, "federalism" has assumed a pejorative 
flavour among the English (though perhaps not the non-English British) who seem wedded to their 
historically unitary State. 
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its part, the Community as yet lacks much of the familiar institutional apparatus 
ofthe modern "State". 
There is a risk that the development of a quasi-federalist structure will lead to a 
breakdown in allocation of responsibility for State functions. Once more, the 
Market has a clearer shape than the State. In fact, the State has changed shape. lt 
operates at different levels. This is a problem of policy which may be traced 
through, inter alia, Environmental Policy and Social Policy. lt has already been 
mentioned above in the context of the protection of Fundamental Rights. lt is 
addressed in this book in the context of Product Safety. 
XI. Product Safety 
Product safety fits well into an inquiry into the potential gap in responsibility 
brought about by the disharmony between negative and positive law. Acting 
alone, national authorities cannot effectively supervise product safety because of 
the process of market integration. The Community insists on an absence of 
physical frontiers55. Yet Community authorities cannot effectively supervise the 
market because of, inter alia, their institutional immaturity and the absence of 
adequately sophisticated communication links. 
Product Safety raises squarely the challenge of regulatory responsibility in a 
developing federation. The Market has assumed a much clearer and more 
dependable shape than the State. This provides an opportunity to measure the 
gap between the two - the "black hole" of lost regulatory responsibility. lt also 
provides the challenge of bringing light to that black hole; the challenge of 
shaping a State to accompany the Market. 
The national reports in Part II of this book provide an intense impression of 
national law and practice developing against a background of the development of 
the Community market. The case studies, both of which exarnine emergencies 
with cross-border implications, provide a vivid feel of the potential 
disadvantages of market integration; not only safe but also unsafe goods are 
traded freely across borders. There are econornies of scale but there are also risks 
of scale. 
55 Art.Sa EEC/7a EC. 
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The papers in Part 1 of the book attempt to provide a reshaping of the material 
accumulated on product safety in Part B. They are motivated by the desire to 
explore more fully the policy issues articulated above. They provide a bridge 
between an empirical study of product safety law and policy and Federalism and 
Responsibility, an inquiry into the nature of the European "State" which is 
emerging, perhaps belatedly, in partial response to the development of the 
European Market. 
The Treaty on European Union has created the status of Citizenship of the 
Union56. The precise nature of Citizenship in this context remains to be 
elaborated. Yet the choice of this determinedly weighty title has evoked 
expectations. These must now be satisfied by both Community and by Member 
States. Here, in fact, is a yet further illustration of the momentum inherent in the 
process of Treaty revision. Conferral of Citizenship provokes an expectation of 
conferral of rights; rights with substance, rights which can be enforced. Yet what 
do rights really mean in the modern context of a European Community and a 
European Union? This presents itself as a major challenge for the Community. 
On its own, product safety is a rather small technical though deserving part of 
the inquiry; but, taken more generally and located in the broader context of 
"rights", it also reflects the totality of the inquiry. That is the pattern of this book. 
Part II presents detailed information. Part I uses that information to build 
towards a more general theory. 
56 Art.8 EC. 
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